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CASE COMMENT
ORDINANCE BANNING "FOR SALE" SIGNS VIOLATES FIRST AMENDMENT
Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
In Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,' the Supreme
Court strengthened first amendment protection for commercial speech.2
The breadth of that protection is uncertain, however, due to insufficient
evidence of a compelling state interest 3 and unanswered questions about
the importance of commercial speech to society. 4 The Court also left
unresolved analytical problems in its application of the time, place, and
manner test 5 and in its use of the term "emergency."6
The City Council of Willingboro, New Jersey, enacted an ordinance7
banning "For Sale" and "Sold" signs from residential property because
it feared the signs would result in panic selling by white residents. 8 The
1. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
2. See notes 89-92 & 110 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 99-102 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 103-09 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 93-98 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 110-12 infra and accompanying text.
7. Ordinance 5-1974 (amended 1974) repealed § 17-6.5 of WILLINGBORO, N.J., REV.
GEN. ORDINANCES ch. XVII. The chapter operates through § 17-2 which reads:
17-2 Legality.
Signs may be erected and maintained in the Township of Willingboro only
when the same comply with the provisions of this chapter, and it shall be
unlawful to erect or maintain any sign at any place within the said Township of
Willingboro when the same does not comply with the provisions of this chapter.
Section 17-6.5 read:
17-6.5 Rental Signs. Signs pertaining to the lease, rental or sale of the premises
on which they appear, subject to the following conditions:
a. The size of the sign shall not exceed eight square feet in area.
b. The sign 'shall be located upon the premises to which it pertains and shall
not project beyond the property line of such premises.
c. Such signs shall be removed within five days after the execution of any
lease, rental agreement or agreement of sale for the premises in question by the
occupant of the premises and/or the owner of the sign.
d. Not more than two such signs are to be placed upon any property.
8. The Court defined "panic selling" of homes as "selling by whites who feared that
the Township was becoming all black." 431 U.S. at 88. The Township argued the loss of
white residents would lead to a decline in property values. Id.
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District Court sustained a local realtor's claim 9 that the ordinance was
unconstitutional' 0 and, after the Third Circuit Court of Appeals revers-
ed," the Supreme Court held:' 2 Absent substantial proof that it will
achieve an important governmental objective,' 3 an ordinance that re-
stricts the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information violates
the first amendment.' 4
The first amendment, applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, 5 provides that there shall be "no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.' ' 6 Despite the preferred position often given the
amendment,' 7 this prohibition is not absolute,' 8 and the Court has devel-
oped a number of tests, ranging from a requirement of clear and present
danger 9 to a balancing of interests 20 to determine whether the state's
9. The case was moot as to the realtor's client who had joined the realtor in
challenging the ordinance in the District Court. See id. at 86 n.l.
10. The district court opinion which was reversed by the Third Circuit was excerpted
at 535 F.2d 786, 792-93 n.5 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). The District Court
found no evidence of panic selling, but merely a fear of declining property values, which
was insufficient to justify the ordinance's restriction on speech.
11. 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1976). The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's
findings of fact but found a paramount governmental interest in preventing "panic-selling
psychology." Id. at 797.
12. 431 U.S. at 85.
13. Id. at 94-96.
14. Id. at 96-97.
15. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
18. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 360 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). Justice Douglas,
however, joined by Justice Black, espoused a minority absolutist position. See, e.g., New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (concurring opinion); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
19. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,639
(1943) ("grave and immediate danger"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
("emergency").
For an interesting discussion of the use of the clear and present danger test to assure the
first amendment's "preferred position," see Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present-
Danger Test: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L.
REV. 60 (1976-1977). Shaman argues the Court should apply the clear and present danger
test in all speech cases and focus "upon the nature and degree of danger that will justify
regulation of speech." Id. at 70. Similarly, Fuchs attempts to answer Emerson's criti-
cisms of the clear and present danger test, Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 910-12 (1%3), and apply a "reconstructed" test. Fuchs,
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regulation of speech is permissible. In a balancing analysis, the state
must demonstrate a "paramount," 2" "overriding," 2 2 "compelling," 23
"substantial, ' 24 or "subordinating" 25 interest to justify the regulation.
The government may reasonably regulate the time, place, or manner of
protected speech 26 to enforce its police powers 27 as long as adequate
Further Steps Toward a General Theory of Freedom of Expression, 18 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 347 (1976).
Some commentators view the test in United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951)
(" 'whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger' ") as part of the clear and present
danger test, and others view it as its demise. Compare Shaman, supra at 70, with
Emerson, supra at 912. The Court used the Dennis test in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976), to strike down a prior restraint. See note 112 infra. For a criticism of
any form of balancing of prior restraints, see Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29
STAN' L. REV. 539, 540-42 (1977).
20. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) ("Where First
Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation, resolution of the issue
always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at
stake in the particular circumstances shown."); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950) ("When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of
speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests
demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented."); cf.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (regulation justified if within
"constitutional powerof the government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and, if the;incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947) ("[Tlhis Court must balance the extent of the guarantees
of freedom against a congressional enactment to protect a democratic society . ... ).
This "ad hoc balancing" has been criticized. See generally Emerson, supra note 19, at
912-14; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
21. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
22. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comms., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
23. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
24. Id. at 444.
25. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
26. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966); Cox v,
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-86
(1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,562 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575-76 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
27. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118-20 (1972) (right of
municipality to assure undisrupted school session); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-
48 (1966) (right of state to control use of jail property); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87
(1949) (right of municipality to prohibit "loud and raucous" sound trucks to protect "quiet
and tranquility" of community).
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alternative methods of communication are available28 and the regulation
is not intended to restrict the content of the speech.29 In Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc. ,3 however, the Court upheld a regulation
restricting the location of theatres showing "adult" films3 1 -a place
restriction on content-because the municipality's intent in regulating the
speaker's message was neutral.32 The plurality emphasized that the City
28. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976); see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
A regulation which does not allow adequate alternatives is void because it abrogates
first amendment freedoms. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1949); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07
(1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451 (1938), with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,574-78 (1941). See generally T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 359-86 (1970); Wright, The Constitu-
tion on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1044 (1969). See also Note, The Public
Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 117
(1975).
29. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("[W]hen
the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First
Amendment strictly limits its power."); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
317 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[S]elective exclusions from a public forum must be closely
scrutinized and countenanced only in cases where the government makes a clear showing
that its action was taken pursuant to neutral 'time, place, and manner' regulations
.... "); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) ("[G]overnment has no
power to restrict such activity because of its message."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96 (1972) ("[S]elective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content
alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone."); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1968) ("[A]ny shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributable to the
content of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled under our Constitution the public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves
offensive to some of their hearers."). See also T. EMERSON, supra note 28, at 359;
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29 (when regulations
"slip from the neutrality of time, place and circumstance into a concern about content,"
considerations of censorship come into play); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975) (The "heart" of the first amendment
prohibits content censorship of speech.).
Prior to Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), discussed in text
accompanying notes 30-33 infra, the Court allowed content-based regulation only in
special contexts. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974)
(intrusion on captive audience); Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 735-40 (1970)
(intrusion on privacy of home); Ginzburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968)
(protection of minors).
30. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
31. Id. at 52-53 nn.3 & 4.
32. Id. at 67. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, stated the city's intent in
promulgating the ordinance was neutral because the city was neither sympathetic nor
hostile to the speaker's message. This was a departure from the traditional view of content
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Council in Young was concerned with the "secondary effect" of the
speech, the deterioration of neighborhoods, rather than the "primary
effect," the citizens' exposure to the speech itself.33
Certain types of speech are unprotected by the first amendment:
obscenity,34 incitement to unlawful action, 35 libel, 36 "fighting words, ,37
and until recently, commercial speech.38 The Supreme Court held in
Valentine v. Chrestensen39 that states could regulate the distribution of
commercial information, n' but failed to explain the basis for the commer-
"neutrality," which forbids any content discrimination per se. See note 29 supra and
sources cited therein.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, sharply dis-
agreed with the plurality, stating Young did not involve a "content-neutral time, place,
and manner restriction":
What this case does involve is the constitutional permissibility of selective
interference with protected speech whose content is thought to produce distaste-
ful effects. It is elementary that a prime function of the First Amendment is to
guard against just such interference. By refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordi-
nance the Court rides roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment
law, which require that time, place, and manner regulations that affect protected
expression be content neutral except in the limited context of a captive or
juvenile audience.
427 U.S. at 85-86 (dissenting opinion).
Justice Stevens contended, however, that despite broad statements by the Court to the
contrary, whether speech is protected often depends on its content. Id. at 63-66. Although
the first amendment forbids total suppression of erotic materials, state regulation of such
materials does not impermissibly impinge on first amendment freedoms. ("[F]ew of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see
'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theatres of our choice."). Id. at 70-71.
Justice Powell, employing a reformulation of the O'Brien test, see note 20 supra, found
Detroit's interest significant and the burden on the first amendment interest incidental.
427 U.S. at 76-84 (concurring opinion). See generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90
HARV. L. REV. 58, 196 (1976).
33. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34. Justice Stevens used this reasoning to distinguish a case
invalidating a similar ordinance, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)
(ordinance regulating films displaying nudity at drive-in theatres). Justice Powell is simi-
larly concerned with the aim of the Common Council. See 427 U.S. at 81-83 nn.4-6. But
see id. at 87-88 (dissent refused to distinguish Erznoznik). See generally The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, supra note 32, at 201. For a discussion of the problems this approach
creates, both generally and in view of Karst's thesis, Karst, supra note 29, at 35-43, see
notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text.
34. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
35. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
36. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
37. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
38. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 55.
[Vol. 1978:258
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 1] "FOR SALE" SIGNS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
cial speech exception;41 thus, most subsequent decisions either ignored or
misapplied Valentine.42 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan43 held that the
first amendment protected allegedly libelous statements' in an advertise-
ment because, by communicating information and expressing griev-
ances, the advertisements contributed to valuable discussion of a public
issue .4  And in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Hu-
man Relations,' the Court refused to protect a newspaper publisher who
printed help-wanted advertisements segregated by sex47 not because the
speech was commercial 48 but rather because the newspaper was engaging
in illegal sex discrimination in employment.4 9
41. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432-48 (1971) examines various
justifications for the commercial speech exception, including Alexander Meiklejohn's
1self-government" theory. Meiklejohn contends the first amendment was designed to
protect societal discussion of public issues to facilitate self-government. Id. at 434-38. See
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255-66. See
generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmen-
tal affairs."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1974).
42. Note, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 761, 768-72 (1976) provides a useful overview of the cases following Valentine, and
compares Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943); with Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); and Town of Green River v.
Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933). See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 28,
at 414-17; Redish, supra note 41, at 431-32, 448-73; Comment, The Right to Receive and
the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J. 775,
795 (1975); Developments in Constitutional Law, Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment: An Emerging Doctrine, 5 HOFsTRA L. REV. 655, 660 (1977).
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25 (advertisement), reprinted in 376 U.S. at 293.
45. 376 U.S. at 265-66. See generally 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 643 (1976); 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 284, 286 (1964).
46. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
47. Id. at 378-81.
48. Id. at 385.
49. Id. at 388-89. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 153, 155
(1973); 48 TUL. L. REV. 426, 428-29 (1974); 12 URB. L. ANN. 221, 226 (1976). But see
Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitu-
tional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 210-13, 218 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
First Amendment Protection).
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Two recent cases have overruled the'Valentine commercial speech
exception. ° In Bigelow v. Virginia,"' a newspaper editor violated a state
statute 52 forbidding the publication of advertisements encouraging abor-
tion.53 Even though the speech was in the form of a commercial adver-
tisement, the Court found it conveyed information of public interest to a
diverse audience54 and was, therefore, entitled to first amendment protec-
tion. The Court applied a balancing analysis55 and, concluding that the
public's first amendment interest in the speech outweighed the state's
regulatory interest,56 invalidated the statute.57 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 58 the Court,
striking down a ban on prescription drug price advertisements, 59 deter-
mined that even purely commercial advertisements 60 were not necessarily
unprotected speech, 61 thereby implicitly rejecting both the self-govern-
ment theory62 and Bigelow's "public interest" criterion. 63 After recog-
50. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
51. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
52. VA. CODE § 18.1-65 (1960) (repealed 1975) reads:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation
of any publication, or through the use of a referral agency for profit, or in any
other manner, encourage or prompt the processing of abortion or miscarriage to
be performed in this State which is prohibited under this article, he shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor.
53. Abortions were illegal in Virginia at that time.
54. 421 U.S. at 822. The Court did consider the commercial form of the speech. Id. at
825-26. The advertisement read, in part: "UNWANTED PREGNANCY. LET US HELP
YOU. Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency requirements. FOR
IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT
LOW COST, Contact WOMEN'S PAVILION, 515 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.
10022 or call any time. . .AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK." Id. at 812.
55. Id. at 826 ("assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it
against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation"). This test is much less
rigorous than the usual first amendment balancing test which requires a showing of
significant state interest. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text. See generally The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 119-20 (1975).
56. 421 U.S. at 827-29. The Court found no relationship between the State's asserted
interest in the quality of Virginia medical care and a ban on an advertisement for New
York abortions.
57. Id. at 826-29.
58. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
59. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974) provided: "Any pharmacist shall be considered
guilty of unprofessional conduct who . . . publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or
indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate
or credit terms . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription."
60. 425 U.S. at 760-62. This differentiates the advertisement from that in Bigelow. See
notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
61. 425 U.S. at 760-62.
62. Id. at 764-65. See note 41 supra.
63. 425 U.S. at 765. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
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nizing that society's interest in the free flow of commercial information,
and the consumers' right to receive that information 65 outweighed the
state's interest in banning drug price advertising,' the Court held that a
state may not totally ban truthful and legitimate commercial information
because of the anticipated harmful effect it may have on disseminators
and recipients.67
Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro68 extended first
amendment protection of commercial speech further despite defendant's
assertion of compelling countervailing interests. After reviewing
Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, the Court found that society's first
amendment interest in the information conveyed by "For Sale" signs
was indistinguishable from its interest in abortion and drug price adver-
tisements, thus entitling the signs to the same first amendment protec-
64. 425 U.S. at 763-65.
65. Id. at 756-57. The Court had infrequently recognized the right to receive informa-
tion. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (right to receive mail from prisoners);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to redeive obscene material); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right to receive "communist political propa-
ganda"); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right to receive religious
information); cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (right to receive information
cannot interfere with plenary Congressional power to exclude aliens); Rowan v. Post
Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (implicit right not to receive "offensive" material). For
a comprehensive review of the "right to receive" doctrine and the implications of Virginia
Pharmacy for the doctrine and commercial speech, see Comment, The Right to Receive
and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J.
775 (1975). See also Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1.
66. 425 U.S. at 766-70. The Court recognized the State's "strong interest in maintain-
ing. . . professionalism" among its pharmacists, but doubted the ban achieved that end.
67. Id. at 773. Although the Court rejected the Bigelow "public interest" test and
adopted a standard of truthfulness and legitimacy, the criteria for determining what type
of speech is commercial and the level of first amendment protection given it remained
unclear. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 32, at 145-52 (1976). See generally
Hunter, Prescription Drugs and Open Housing: More on Commercial Speech, 25 EMORY
L.J. 815, 826-27 (1976); Comment, First Amendment Protection, supra note 49, at 227-34
(1976).
The Court explicitly exempted regulation of false and misleading advertisements, pro-
posals of illegal transactions, special problems of electronic broadcast media, and time,
place or manner of commercial speech from its holding. 425 U.S. at 770-73. It
retained the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech primarily to
permit regulation of deceptive or misleading commercial speech, which is less likely to be
chilled than political speech. Id. at 771-72 n.24. See generally Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1029 (1967) (false advertising traditionally
outside protection of first amendment).
68. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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tions. 69 The Court then used traditional first amendment standards7° to
reject Willingboro's claim that the ordinance was a reasonable time,
place, or manner regulation of protected speech: 71 alternative realty
advertising methods restricted the seller's autonomy, were too expen-
sive, and were less effective in reaching potential buyers .72 Furthermore,
Willingboro enacted the ordinance to regulate the content of the
communication; 73 it was not concerned with aesthetics, individual priva-
cy, protection of a group it had a right to protect, or the "secondary
effect" of the ordinance. 74 Rather, Willingboro feared the signs' "pri-
mary effect"-people would engage in panic selling as a result of the
signs' message. 75
Because Willingboro intended to regulate the content rather than the
time, place, or manner of the communication, the Court adopted a
balancing analysis that required Willingboro to demonstrate an interest
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the heavy presumption of protection
for the speech. 76 Although the township's asserted goal of stable, inte-
grated neighborhoods was significant,77 Willingboro did not prove a
substantial incidence of panic selling78 caused by the "For Sale" signs
69. Id. at 91-93. The Court also noted that it had not decided Virginia Pharmacy when
the Court of Appeals wrote its Linmark opinion. Id. at 92 n.6.
70. 431 U.S. at 93-94. The cases the Court cited discuss the danger of potential
restrictions on free exercise of religion and political speech. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[G]overnments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular
words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views."); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 103 (1949) ("It is of particular importance in a government where
people elect their officials that the fullest opportunity be afforded candidates to express
and voters to hear their views."); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)
("Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people.").
71. 431 U.S. at 93. Defendants in Virginia Pharmacy could not make this time, place,
or manner argument because that ordinance banned all advertising on drug prices, where-
as the Linmark ordinance prohibited the use of only one mode of advertising, the "For
Sale" sign. See 425 U.S. at 771.
72. 431 U.S. at 93. The Court mentioned newspaper advertising and listing with real
estate agents. Id.
73. Id. at 94.
74. Id. at 93-94.
75. Id. at 94. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
76. 431 U.S. at 95. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
77. 431 U.S. at 94. The Court accepted the Court of Appeals' assumption that
Willingboro enacted the ordinance to prevent panic selling and thus promote integrated
housing. 535 F.2d 786, 797-802 (3d Cir. 1976). But see id. at 792-93 n.5 (district court
finding that Willingboro's purpose was discriminatory: to maintain a racial balance favor-
able to whites); id. at 805-13 (dissenting opinion).
78. 431 U.S. at 93-94.
[Vol. 1978:258
Washington University Open Scholarship
"FOR SALE" SIGNS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
and, therefore, failed to demonstrate the ordinance's necessity.79 The
Court, however, explicitly reserved judgment80 on Barrick Realty, Inc.
v. City of Gary,81 a case identical to Linmark except that Gary provided
evidence of panic selling. 82
Even if Willingboro had demonstrated the ordinance's necessity, the
Court intimated that it still would have invalidated the ordinance because
of a "more basic" constitutional problem. 83 The realty information
restricted by the ordinance was of vital interest to Willingboro's citizens
in deciding where to live and raise their families,84 and these citizens had
a right to receive this information.85 Although Willingboro banned the
signs to protect its residents from acting against their own best interests
by engaging in "panic" selling, 86 the Court concluded that " '[o]nly an
emergency can justify repression' "87 of the flow of truthful and legiti-
mate information. 88
The Court, by invalidating the Linmark ordinance, strengthened the
consumers' right to receive commercial information. 89 It could have
sustained the ordinance as a time, place, or manner regulation because,
unlike the total bans of Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, the Linmark
ordinance restricted only one mode of advertising. 90 Instead, the Court
applied the rigorous criteria of political expression and religious exercise
cases to closely scrutinize the adequacy of alternative modes of
79. d.
80. Id. at 95 n.9.
81. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 163-64. Linmark intimates, however, that even if panic selling were shown,
these sign bans may have no reasonable relation to the asserted governmental interest. See
431 U.S. at 96 n. 10 (citing Laska & Hewitt, Are Laws Against 'For Sale'Signs Constitu-
tional? Substantive Due Process Revisited, 4 REAL EsT. L.J. 153 (1975) (ban on "For
Sale" signs may be ineffective or even counterproductive in eliminating panic selling)).
83. 431 U.S. at 96.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 96-97.
86. Id. at 97.
87. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).
88. Id. at 98. The Court encouraged Willingboro to continue to promote integrated
housing through alternative means such as educating citizens and erecting "Not for Sale"
signs.
The last paragraph of the opinion defined commercial speech as that which " 'does no
more than propose a commercial transaction'" and indicated a "'different degree of
protection' " might be required to prevent "deceptive," "false" or "misleading" signs.
See note 67 supra.
89. See notes 64-67, 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 71 supra.
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communication. 91 The Court thus gave a full quantum of first amendment
protection to the public's right to receive commercial information. 92
Unfortunately, in rejecting the time, place, or manner argument,
Linmark adopted the troublesome Young primary/secondary effect dis-
tinction.93 In Young the city could restrict the location of adult theatres
because it was concerned with the secondary effect of neighborhood
deterioration rather than the primary effect of the content of the offensive
speech.94 Willingboro, however, could have argued similarly that it had
enacted the ordinance to prevent the secondary effect of neighborhood
deterioration caused by numerous "For Sale" signs and that the restric-
tion on the flow of realty information-the primary effect-was only
incidental. The distinction between Linmark and Young, therefore,
turned on the Court's intuitive determination that Willingboro was
concerned with the signs' message rather than their secondary effect. 95
To determine the validity of a time, place, or manner regulation,
therefore, the Court must now evaluate the regulator's intent. 96 In allow-
ing content regulation as long as the intent is neutral, the Court overlooks
the problem of unequal impact despite the "formal" neutrality of the
intent.97 The Court should restrict itself to the more objective evaluation
of adequate alternatives. 98
In addition, the Court's failure to resolve three important issues ob-
scures the extent of first amendment protection for commercial speech.
First, although the Court acknowledged the importance of Willingboro's
interest in promoting integrated housing, it did not have to decide
whether that interest would be sufficiently compelling to justify the free
speech infringement, because Willingboro failed to prove the existence
91. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
92. The breadth of this protection turns on the "vital interest" question. See notes
103-09 infra and accompanying text.
93. See text accompanying notes 33, 73-75 supra.
94. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. Only a plurality of the Young Court
accepted the distinction. See note 32 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
96. For discussion of the problems inherent in evaluating legislative intent, see, e.g.,
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). Because the Linmark Court looked to the
record of the Willingboro hearings, this could encourage a legislature to "pad" the record
with statements about its concern over the secondary effect.
97. See Karst, supra note 29, at 35.
98. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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of substantial panic selling. 99 By reserving judgment on Barrick Realty,
Inc. v. City of Gary,10 in which a district court upheld an ordinance
identical to Willingboro 's on a record containing substantial evidence of
panic selling,"' the Court implied that a proven governmental interest in
integrated housing may outweigh first amendment freedoms.102
Secondly, the Court emphasized the significance of realty information
and its vital role in the personal decision of where to live and raise a
family. 103 In so doing, the Court failed to indicate whether only "vital"
commercial information is entitled to full first amendment protection or
whether all commercial information is vital and thus within the first
amendment. As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court stated its holding
broadly as prohibiting impairment of the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information." 4 And in Bates v. State Bar,"15 decided soon
after Linmark, the Court struck down a ban on the advertising of legal
services and stated its holding narrowly,10 6 but emphasized in dictum the
social value of all commercial speech. 107 Virginia Pharmacy, Bates, and
99. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the balance of interests in a situation analogous to Linmark, see
Note, Freedom of Expression in the Land Use Planning Context: Preserving the Barrier of
Presumptive Validity, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 954 (1976).
100. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
101. See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
102. The Court had to determine neither whether these bans have any reasonable
relation to the governmental interest, see Laska & Hewitt, supra note 82, nor whether
Willingboro's purpose was discriminatory: if the ordinance was invalid for the asserted
purpose of promoting integrated housing, a fortiori it was invalid for the purpose of
perpetuating a racial imbalance. See note 77 supra. But a racially discriminatory purpose,
pattern, and practice may fundamentally change the nature of the interests. See note 111
infra ("Blockbusting" may create an emergency justifying repression of first amendment
interests).
The Court also emphasized the significance of the commercial information to the
recipients. If it is not vital to the recipients, see notes 103-09 infra and accompanying text,
but only important to the disseminator, it may alter the balance of interests, with less
weight accorded disseminator than recipient interests. Cf. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 380-81 (1977) (first amendment overbreadth challenge rejected because problem of
"chilling effect" on disseminator's speech does not arise in commercial context).
103. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
104. 431 U.S. at 96-97.
105. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
106. "The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may prevent the
publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement concerning the availabil-
ity and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the flow of such information
may not be restrained .... ." Id. at 384.
107. E.g., "[Clommercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature,
and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system." Id. at 364. Accord, Carey v.
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Linmark also indicate that the Court's main concern in distinguishing
commercial from non-commercial speech is to enable government to
protect the public from false and misleading commercial speech. 108 The
Court may employ this distinction to differentiate levels of protection for
commercial speech depending on the relation of its subject matter to the
individual's vital interests. 1' 9
Finally, although Linmark asserted that government may restrict the
public's right to receive information during an emergency, 110 the Court
failed to define the term."' The emergency language, therefore, adds a
rhetorically strong but analytically weak component to the first amend-
ment test.1
12
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-01 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 765.
108. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. at 383-84; notes 67 & 88 supra.
109. Cf. Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977) (over a strong dissent, Court
allowed jury to consider commercial aspects of the obscene material, particularly whether
defendant commercially exploited it for sake of prurient appeal, in determining whether
the material was without redeeming social importance).
The Court may be reinstituting the Bigelow "public interest" test, see notes 54-55 & 67
supra and accompanying text, to determine the degree of protection given the particular
commercial speech. In Linmark, the presumption of full first amendment protection is
stronger than in Bigelow. Bigelow would require the Court to make case-by-case determi-
nations. See Hunter, supra note 67, at 824.
110. 431 U.S. at 97.
I1l. A high level of panic selling, similar to that in Barrick, see notes 80-82 and
accompanying text, causing destabilization of an integrated community might qualify as
an emergency. For instance, a proven pattern and practice of "blockbusting," inducing
whites to sell houses below value by instilling fear of complete racial turnover, may create
an emergency. There was evidence of blockbusting in Barrick, see 491 F.2d at 164. The
Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804(e), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970), an anti-blockbusting statute,
has been upheld, albeit under the rationale that commercial speech is unprotected. See,
e.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 826 (1973); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United
States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969). See generally Note, Blockbusting: A
Novel Statutory Approach to an Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 538 (1971); Comment, Blockbusting: Judicial and Legislative Response to Real
Estate Dealers' Excesses, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 818 (1973); Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO.
L.J. 170 (1970).
112. The Court's failure to define this term is not a new problem. See sources cited in
note 19 supra. However, reading Linmark with Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1977) (gag order on press is an unconstitutional prior restraint even when issued to
ensure defendant's right to a fair trial), the Court appears to afford the term emergency
some substance. As in Linmark, the state's interest could be achieved by alternative
methods, id. at 563-65, and the perceived danger was conjectural, id. at 567. This
delineation of "emergency" could revitalize the clear and present danger test. See
Shaman, supra note 19; Fuchs, supra note 19.
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The Linmark Court weakens the impact of its first amendment protec-
tion for society's right to receive commercial speech"13 by failing to
define key concepts in its analysis. The Court should define emergen-
cy," 4 eliminate the Young primary/secondary effect distinction,115 and
state whether all commercial speech is of vital interest.116 Furthermore,
the public's right to receive commercial information may outweigh the
concededly substantial governmental interest in preserving integrated
neighborhoods, but the Court will not balance these interests until
confronted with a case where the governmental interest is threatened by-
evidence of panic selling."i7
113. See notes 89-92 & 110 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 93-98 supra and accompanying text.
116. See notes 103-09 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text.
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